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INTRODUCTION 
In today’s economy, public corporations are increasingly owned by 
diversified shareholders.  Yet these corporations continue to sue each other 
all the time for breach of contract, patent infringement, theft of trade 
secrets, and myriad other legal wrongs.  Such lawsuits—in which 
diversified shareholders essentially sue themselves—call into question the 
standard academic theories of corporate liability.  Those theories posit that 
corporate liability serves to compensate victims and—by forcing 
shareholders to bear the costs of their agents’ actions—to deter wrongdoing.  
But the compensation rationale fails when those being compensated are also 
paying the damages.  And the deterrence rationale fails when the owners of 
the injurer also own the victim, because then the injurer’s shareholders 
internalize the costs of their agents’ actions regardless of whether a lawsuit 
is brought. 
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The puzzle of self-suing shareholders was first noticed in the context of 
“fraud-on-the-market” class actions, in which shareholders try to collect 
damages from their corporation for allegedly false statements by managers.  
Critics argue that these lawsuits merely shift wealth from one shareholder 
pocket to another, minus a hefty attorneys’ fee.  Randall Thomas and James 
Cox have countered this circularity critique with a reductio ad absurdum, 
arguing that the same point could be made about any lawsuit between 
companies owned by diversified shareholders.1  And yet, Thomas and Cox 
assert, such firm-on-firm lawsuits must be socially valuable, albeit for 
reasons they do not specify.2 
In this Essay, we introduce a new theory of corporate liability—called 
the “informational” theory—that seeks to explain why litigation between 
publicly traded firms can in fact be socially valuable even when those firms 
are owned by the same shareholders.  We posit that such litigation makes 
sense not in conventional terms of compensation and deterrence, but rather 
in terms of the principal–agent conflict between diversified shareholders 
and undiversified managers.  In short, we show how “intraportfolio 
litigation”—in which one firm in a diversified shareholder’s portfolio sues 
another—can serve as a corporate governance tool.  Intraportfolio litigation 
can improve the quality of firm-specific financial data, making earnings 
reports and stock prices better measures of the contribution of each firm’s 
managers to overall portfolio value. 
Our argument that intraportfolio lawsuits can make managers better 
agents is related to the standard deterrence rationale for corporate liability, 
except that we invert the normal way of thinking about means and 
incentives.  Existing theories of corporate liability assume that shareholders 
have the means to discipline corporate agents but lack the incentive to do so 
when the agents injure third parties.  Under this account, corporate liability 
supplies the missing incentive by forcing the shareholders, within the 
confines of limited corporate liability, to bear the costs of their agents’ 
actions. 
With respect to intraportfolio litigation, we make the reverse claim.  
Diversified shareholders already have the incentive to prevent their agents 
from imposing excessive costs on other corporations that the shareholders 
own.  What diversified shareholders lack are cost-effective means to act on 
this incentive.  Information deficits and collective action problems make it 
uneconomical for shareholders to police managers’ behavior directly.  All 
the shareholders can do is encourage a manager to maximize her firm’s 
 
1  James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Mapping the American Shareholder Litigation Experience: A 
Survey of Empirical Studies of the Enforcement of the U.S. Securities Law, 6 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. 
REV. 164, 177 (2009).  
2  Id.  Thomas and Cox argue that lawsuits among diversified shareholders vindicate an “important 
principle,” though it is unclear whether this principle is something other than the simple right to sue.  Id.  
In Part V we revisit their reductio in the light of the theory of corporate liability that we develop. 
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profits by, for example, tying her pay to the firm’s stock price.  But this 
motivational technique introduces a conflict of interest, as the manager 
could inflate her firm’s reported profits through conduct that, by imposing 
costs on other public firms, diminishes the overall value of the 
shareholders’ portfolio.  Allowing the injured firm to collect damages from 
the injuring firm corrects the distortion that would otherwise appear in each 
firm’s reported profits.  Put another way, intraportfolio litigation makes it 
easier for shareholders to evaluate and motivate their agents, because it 
attributes costs that the shareholders already bear to the responsible 
corporate managers. 
We believe that this informational theory places a conceptual 
foundation beneath a wide variety of civil lawsuits between public firms 
with potentially overlapping owners—including contract actions, and tort 
actions based on negligence or strict liability.  There are limits, however, to 
how much self-suing activity the theory can salvage.  In particular, we 
doubt it can justify the very category of lawsuits that started the circularity 
debate in the first place: the securities fraud class action.  For one thing, the 
informational value of private securities lawsuits against public 
corporations is low, both because the calculation of damages in such cases 
overstates the actual injury to portfolio value, and because most corporate 
fraud is already revealed through other sources.  In addition, securities fraud 
is likely to be well deterred by direct lawsuits against the responsible 
managers, making corporate liability unnecessary.  In these ways securities 
fraud is different from other legal causes of action, which if directed solely 
against corporate agents would either underdeter them (because, for 
example, the responsible agents are judgment proof) or overdeter them 
(because the actionable conduct also confers benefits on shareholders that 
the agents do not internalize).  We thus believe that the informational theory 
rebuts the Thomas and Cox reductio ad absurdum, as it provides a 
principled distinction between securities fraud class actions and other 
potentially circular intercorporate lawsuits. 
This Essay has five Parts.  Part I surveys the traditional scholarly 
justifications for corporate liability.  Part II lays out the circularity critique 
of corporate liability in fraud-on-the-market class actions.  Part III extends 
that critique to intercorporate litigation generally.  Part IV explains how the 
informational theory might justify corporate liability even in lawsuits 
between firms owned by the same shareholders.  Part V returns to the topic 
of fraud-on-the-market class actions, and examines whether these actions 
can be defended on informational grounds.  In the Essay’s conclusion, we 
extend its argument by briefly considering how a manager’s decision to 
initiate an intraportfolio lawsuit can itself be a source of principal–agent 
conflict. 
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I. TRADITIONAL JUSTIFICATIONS OF CORPORATE LIABILITY 
When a corporation is held liable for the acts of its agents, it is its 
shareholders—within the constraints of limited shareholder liability—who 
foot the bill.  Corporate liability can arise through a variety of legal sources.  
Like other employers, corporations face respondeat superior liability, 
meaning that they are strictly liable for torts committed by their employees 
acting within the scope of their employment.3  Corporations can also be 
held liable for employee violations of statutes and regulations.4  And when a 
corporate agent causes the corporation to breach a contract, it is the 
corporation rather than the agent that the law holds accountable.5  Finally, 
corporations can voluntarily assume their employees’ liability by promising 
to indemnify them or by purchasing liability insurance coverage on their 
behalf.6 
Scholars have developed several theories to justify these forms of 
liability, which we will refer to collectively as instances of “corporate 
liability.”  The theories fall into two general categories, which we describe 
below. 
A. Compensation 
The most straightforward compensation rationales sound in notions of 
fairness.7  It is unfair, the argument goes, for a person to bear a loss that is 
someone else’s fault.  When that someone else is a corporate employee who 
was acting within the scope of his employment, it is fair that the corporation 
should be required to make the victim whole, at least to the extent that the 
relatively more culpable employee cannot.  The employer defines the scope 
of employment and hence is responsible for placing the employee in a 
position to harm third parties. 
Another compensation rationale identifies a risk-spreading or insurance 
benefit in shifting losses from third-party victims to corporations.8  The 
 
3  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (2006). 
4  See, e.g., Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities 
Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 696 & n.22 (observing that “most courts of 
appeal now hold that the common law doctrine of respondeat superior applies to securities fraud 
actions” brought pursuant to federal law, and collecting cases). 
5  See Robert B. Thompson, Unpacking Limited Liability: Direct and Vicarious Liability of 
Corporate Participants for Torts of the Enterprise, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1, 7 (1994) (“An individual who 
signs a contract on behalf of the corporation is cloaked in the mantle of the enterprise and is not 
personally liable for action taken in the corporate name.”). 
6  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (2010). 
7  For a description and critical review of fairness justifications for enterprise liability, see Gary T. 
Schwartz, The Hidden and Fundamental Issue of Employer Vicarious Liability, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1739, 1749–54 (1996). 
8  For the classic treatment of this argument, see GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A 
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 50–54 (1970).  For a more recent discussion of the insurance 
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presumption is that corporations are more efficient risk bearers than the 
typical victim because they tend to have many shareholders9 and can more 
easily buy insurance.  Forcing the corporation to compensate the victim 
spreads the loss from one person to many, which from a social perspective 
makes the loss less onerous. 
B. Deterrence 
By far the best developed justifications for corporate liability focus on 
its potential to increase social welfare by promoting the goal of optimal 
deterrence.  A legal system promotes this goal when it forces actors to bear 
the full social costs of their conduct, thereby encouraging them to engage in 
the conduct only if the total costs of doing so are outweighed by the 
benefits.10  Deterrence arguments for corporate liability come in two 
varieties.  The first contends that corporate liability is necessary to prevent 
underdeterrence in situations when employees are inadequately deterred by 
personal liability.  The second maintains that corporate liability is necessary 
when employees might react too strongly to personal liability, refraining 
from activity that imposes costs on third parties but that is nonetheless 
socially worthwhile. 
1. Underdeterrence: The Lawsuit-Resistant Employee.—It is natural 
to assume that people without money will not heed the threat of monetary 
sanctions.  These so-called “judgment-proof” defendants are the most 
widely cited justification for corporate liability.11  The argument is 
straightforward: since many employees are judgment proof, holding 
employers liable for employee conduct enhances deterrence by encouraging 
 
justification for litigation generally, see Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Do Class Action Lawyers Make Too 
Little?, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2043, 2060–61 (2010). 
9  See Steven P. Croley, Vicarious Liability in Tort: On the Sources and Limits of Employee 
Reasonableness, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1705, 1707 (1996). 
10  This result may be achieved if the law attaches a monetary sanction to behavior equal to its social 
costs multiplied by the inverse of the probability that the sanction will be imposed, assuming well-
informed, risk-neutral, rational actors.  See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
OF LAW 483 (2004) (“Thus, if the harm is 100 and the probability of sanctions is 50 percent, the sanction 
should be multiplied by 1/.5 = 2, so the sanction should equal 200 (and thus the expected sanction would 
equal 100) . . . .”).  On the other hand, society may deem the utility derived from certain categories of 
activities to be illegitimate; the goal of sanctions targeted at such activities would be to deter them 
altogether rather than to encourage would-be perpetrators to weigh social costs against personal benefits. 
11  See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 188–90 (7th ed. 2007); Arlen & 
Carney, supra note 4, at 707; Note, An Efficiency Analysis of Vicarious Liability Under the Law of 
Agency, 91 YALE L.J. 168, 168 (1981).  Even a sanction that a person cannot fully pay should deter him 
so long as the expected amount of liability he can pay is greater than the benefit he would derive from 
the proscribed behavior.  Thus, the problem of judgment-proof defendants is particularly likely to 
undermine deterrence with respect to people who are poor or who have a great deal to gain from the 
sanctionable conduct.  See, e.g., Arlen & Carney, supra note 4, at 703 (hypothesizing that corporate 
officers are most likely to commit securities fraud when they perceive it as necessary to preserve their 
jobs and their personal wealth that is tied to the value of their firm’s stock). 
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the employers to take measures that limit the costs their employees impose 
on third parties.12  An employer might screen applicants for their propensity 
to take care, monitor employee conduct on the job, modify production 
processes to reduce the likelihood of harm, or use pay and promotions to 
reward prudence and punish recklessness.13  The employer also might 
reduce activity levels to decrease the risk that its operations or products will 
cause harm.14  In the absence of liability, the argument goes, employers 
would lack incentive to invest in socially desirable deterrence efforts or to 
scale back production to efficient levels.  Indeed, employers might 
encourage employee conduct that generates social costs in excess of social 
benefits, so long as those costs are externalized to third parties.15 
There are reasons beyond a lack of personal wealth why personal 
liability for employees might be an inadequate deterrent.  In some situations 
it may be impossible for victims to discover or prove which particular 
employees within a firm caused their injuries.16  To the extent they know of 
this possibility, employees will discount the risk of personal liability 
 
12  Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Economic Analysis of the Choice Between Enterprise and Personal 
Liability for Accidents, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1345, 1362–63 (1982). 
13  For discussions of these methods, see Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate 
Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687, 702–03, 706 (1997); 
Alan O. Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the Scope of 
Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 563, 569–70 (1988) [hereinafter 
Sykes I]; Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 1231, 1255–56 (1984) 
[hereinafter Sykes II].  On the other hand, there may be situations where the employer can do nothing to 
affect employee behavior, such as when the behavior is difficult to observe and the employee has no 
interest in maintaining a long-term employment relationship.  See Sykes II, supra, at 1247–52.  In these 
situations, respondeat superior liability might lead to worse behavior by employees.  See Sykes I, supra, 
at 570.  Respondeat superior liability also may undermine deterrence if employer efforts to deter 
employee misconduct increase the probability that the employee’s misconduct will be detected and 
hence expose the employer to a greater risk of sanction.  Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects 
of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833, 842–43 (1994). 
14  The possibility that employers will adjust activity levels is a commonly cited reason why 
vicarious liability is strict.  See Sykes II, supra note 13, at 569.  If such liability instead were duty-based, 
employers might escape liability on grounds that they had invested in all cost-justified precautions, even 
though the employer was producing at levels at which the marginal social value of output was less than 
its marginal social costs.  This argument for strict liability assumes that courts would not take production 
levels into account when evaluating the employer’s standard of care.  See SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 
198. 
15  See, e.g., Sykes II, supra note 13, at 1241–42.  This hazard is most likely to arise when the 
victims do not have a contractual relationship with the employer.  If they do—for example, if they are 
customers or other employees of the firm—and if they have accurate information about the risks posed 
by the firm’s operations, then demand for the firm’s output will fall or its labor costs will rise, causing 
the firm to internalize the expected social costs of its employees’ conduct.  SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 
213. 
16  See Kornhauser, supra note 12, at 1350 (explaining that placing liability on the employee alone 
may result in too many accidents because injuries may “result from a complicated combination of acts 
by various agents” that courts cannot untangle, thus allowing “many agents [to] escape liability because 
the plaintiff cannot prove a particular agent was at fault”). 
105:1679  (2011) Intraportfolio Litigation 
 1685
accordingly.  Placing liability on the employer might then be efficient 
because the employer might take steps to prevent the injury from occurring 
in the first place.17  Alternatively, employees might systematically 
underestimate liability risk in a way that employers do not.  This might 
occur because the employees have less information than employers or are 
more susceptible to behavioral biases.18  In such situations, holding 
employers liable will increase deterrence toward efficient levels.19 
2. Overdeterrence: The Lawsuit-Overreactive Employee.—While 
some employees will underreact to personal liability, others will overreact.  
And this too can be a justification for corporate liability.  Overreaction to 
liability can be a problem because some business activities impose costs on 
third parties but nonetheless create social wealth.  Factories that make 
valuable products may pollute neighboring farmland.  Contract breaches are 
sometimes efficient even though the counterparty suffers a reliance cost.  
When an employee decides, on his employer’s behalf, to build a factory or 
breach a contract, most of the benefit goes to the employer in the form of 
higher profits.  This means that if the employee is held personally liable for 
the costs of such decisions, he will face an asymmetric payoff function: the 
expected cost of the decision to him might be greater than his expected 
personal gain even though the decision creates wealth for society as a 
whole.  The employee will therefore be overdeterred.20  In the case of the 
factory, he might spend more employer resources on pollution scrubbers 
than is justified, or he might refuse to build the factory at all.  In the case of 
 
17  See id. at 1370.  For liability against the employer to be justified on this basis, the plaintiff must, 
as a legal matter, be able to hold the employer liable despite the plaintiff’s inability to hold anyone 
within the firm individually responsible.  This will not always be the case.  For example, in securities 
fraud litigation, courts have rejected the notion of “collective scienter,” instead requiring plaintiffs to 
plead and prove that specific individuals acted with the requisite intent.  See, e.g., Teamsters Local 445 
Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Dynex Capital Inc., 531 F.3d 190, 195 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (citing Brief of Appellant at 17); Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs Inc., 513 F.3d 
702, 708 (7th Cir. 2008); see also Schwartz, supra note 7, at 1756 (identifying other weaknesses with 
this rationale). 
18  See Croley, supra note 9, at 1733–37; Kornhauser, supra note 12, at 1373. 
19  In addition to the deterrence measures available to employers that we have already discussed, 
employers also might try to avoid liability by educating employees about true risk levels.  See, e.g., 
Croley, supra note 9, at 1731.  Importantly, the notion that vicarious liability will promote deterrence in 
this context assumes that employers would be unable to shift the expected liability back onto employees 
through indemnity actions, compensation practices, or otherwise.  See Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 
13, at 852 (explaining that if corporations can shift liability back to employees without cost, “they will 
not treat this liability as a cost, and thus vicarious liability will not induce firms to incur enforcement 
expenditures”).  Shifting liability back to employees may be infeasible due to transaction costs or 
because the employees are judgment proof. 
20  See Bruce Chapman, Corporate Tort Liability and the Problem of Overcompliance, 69 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1679, 1693 (1996) (observing that employees whom employers cannot cheaply monitor may 
“overcomply” with legal standards when they face personal liability but can pass compliance costs on to 
their employer). 
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the contract, he might refuse to order a breach even though complying with 
the contract is, from a social perspective, no longer worthwhile. 
A second reason that personal liability might overdeter applies with 
particular force to corporate agents.  Legal liability is fraught with chance.  
The whims of judges and juries, the happenstance of accidents, and the 
natural limits of human self-control mean that even conscientious 
employees cannot fully predetermine their future liability.  This uncertainty 
increases the deterrent effect of personal liability for employees who are 
risk averse, as most are.21  Shareholders are naturally risk averse too, but 
they can reduce much of their firm-specific risk by holding a diversified 
investment portfolio.22  This means that, as a structural matter, diversified 
shareholders will be less risk averse than their agents with respect to 
liability for harms those agents cause.  From their perspective, corporate 
agents who face personal liability may therefore give too much weight to 
liability risk when making decisions on the corporation’s behalf. 
To overcome this overdeterrence problem, shareholders may want to 
shield their agents from personal liability.  We see here a justification for 
the common law rule whereby an agent who causes his principal to breach a 
contract is not held liable to the principal’s counterparty.  And for those 
areas of law in which employees are held liable, such as tort law, employers 
often agree to shield them contractually.23  For example, Delaware 
corporations are allowed to indemnify their managers and other employees 
against personal liability so long as the agent was honestly seeking to 
advance the corporation’s interests.24 
Once, however, the employee is shielded from liability, he will be 
lawsuit-resistant, much like someone who lacks personal wealth and thus 
has nothing to lose in a civil suit.  The employee might then cause his firm 
to underinvest in pollution-reducing technologies or to breach contracts 
whenever there is some personal advantage in doing so.  For such an 
employee, the underdeterrence justification for employer liability 
reemerges.  If the employer is held liable, then she (or, if a firm, its owners) 
will have the incentive to utilize the various means at an employer’s 
 
21  See, e.g., SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 225 (observing that uncertainty in the negligence 
determination can cause risk-averse parties to be excessively careful). 
22  See Sykes II, supra note 13, at 1235–36 (offering reasons why employers are likely to be less risk 
averse than employees). 
23  As an alternative to indemnification, an employer could purchase liability insurance on the 
employee’s behalf.  See Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal 
Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857, 865 (1984).  Insurers are better risk- bearers than employers when the 
employer is not owned by numerous diversified shareholders or is small enough that its liability risk 
could render it insolvent and thereby generate the costs of financial distress. 
24  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a)–(b) (2010).  
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disposal to prevent employees from engaging in socially wasteful conduct.25  
When the employer indemnifies the employee, this transfer of liability 
happens automatically.  But even when no indemnification agreement is in 
place, the employer may be held liable as a formal legal matter, either 
directly (as in breach of contract cases) or vicariously (as in tort and 
criminal cases).  In either situation, the employer internalizes the costs of 
the employee’s conduct.  And because the employer also typically receives 
the benefits of that conduct, she will be more likely to strike the wealth-
maximizing balance between encouraging employees to engage in 
productive activity and preventing them from injuring third parties. 
It is interesting to note that the two categories of employee we have 
described—the lawsuit overreactive and the lawsuit underreactive—are not 
mutually exclusive.  Imagine a corporate manager who is deciding whether 
to engage in activity that will generate $200 in profits for her corporation 
but will impose a $100 cost on a third party.  Imagine further that the 
manager has $50 in personal wealth.  As traditionally defined, this manager 
is judgment proof: the liability the activity would generate ($100) exceeds 
her personal wealth ($50).  Yet from a social perspective the manager may 
be overdeterred if she is held personally liable.  The activity is socially 
worthwhile, with benefits ($200) in excess of costs ($100).  But the manger 
might refrain from engaging in it because she stands to lose her $50 while 
the $200 upside will go to her firm’s shareholders. 
II. THE CIRCULARITY CRITIQUE OF SECURITIES FRAUD CLASS ACTIONS 
Many scholars agree that the compensation rationales for corporate 
liability fail in the context of fraud-on-the-market lawsuits.26  In a typical 
fraud-on-the-market case, a corporation’s managers have allegedly made 
misleading statements that inflated the corporation’s stock price, and 
investors who bought the overpriced stock on a public exchange sue the 
corporation to recover their losses.27  Although the investors often sue the 
responsible managers as well, the managers rarely pay anything.  Instead, 
the corporation or its insurer foots the bill.28 
 
25  Employers can avoid harms caused by employees by screening them for carefulness, monitoring 
them on the job and adjusting their pay and promotions accordingly, investing in safety measures, and 
adjusting production levels.  See supra Part I.B.1. 
26  James J. Park, Shareholder Compensation as Dividend, 108 MICH. L. REV. 323, 328 (2009) 
(“[M]ost scholars have concluded that securities-fraud actions are inherently unable to compensate 
investors because of a circularity problem.”). 
27  Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: Restructuring the Relationship 
Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule 10b-5, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1301, 1312 (2008). 
28  See John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its 
Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1550 (2006) (observing that the corporate defendant and its 
insurer typically advance the entire settlement amount). 
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The critique of corporate liability in these actions begins with the 
observation that diversified investors both buy and sell shares on the stock 
market.  They therefore are just as likely to benefit from fraud that inflates 
stock prices as they are to be injured by it, and these gains and losses are 
likely to net out over time.29  Thus, to the extent that most investors are 
diversified, fraud-on-the-market class actions do not promote compensatory 
goals, for the simple reason that diversified shareholders suffer no net loss 
that requires compensation. 
Shareholder diversification also undermines the deterrence rationale 
for corporate liability in fraud-on-the-market lawsuits.30  As noted 
previously, the deterrence rationale posits that activity which imposes costs 
on third parties will be curbed if those costs are shifted to parties in a better 
position to prevent them.  In a fraud-on-the-market suit, any possible 
deterrence benefit would derive from the shifting of losses from the plaintiff 
class of shareholders to the owners of the corporation whose agents 
committed the fraud.  This benefit will not arise, however, with respect to 
diversified shareholders who over time are just as likely to be owners of the 
defendant corporations as members of the plaintiff classes.  Indeed, many 
members of a plaintiff class may continue to be shareholders of the very 
corporation they are suing.31  Corporate liability in such cases is, from the 
perspective of diversified shareholders, mere pocket shifting.  Since the 
damages awards do not threaten diversified shareholders with the prospect 
of a net loss, they do not have the deterrent effect normally attributed to 
civil liability.32 
 
29  This argument is traceable to Judge Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel’s seminal article, 
Optimal Damages in Securities Cases, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 611 (1985).  See, e.g., Alicia Davis Evans, 
The Investor Compensation Fund, 33 J. CORP. L. 223, 225 (2007) (“[S]cholars . . . have used 
Easterbrook and Fischel’s insight to decry the provision of securities fraud compensation as 
inefficient . . . .”).  While this is the prevailing view, and we adopt it here for purposes of analysis, we 
note that it has not gone unchallenged.  See, e.g., id. at 229–34 (arguing that even diversified investors 
may suffer net losses as a result of securities fraud if, for example, they are net purchasers of stock, or if 
stock prices drop upon the revelation of fraud below where they would have traded without fraud); Park, 
supra note 26 at 340–41 (arguing that diversification may not completely protect unsophisticated 
investors from fraud losses if such losses are not randomly distributed but rather are concentrated on 
corporate outsiders). 
30  Because they are the most controversial, we focus on fraud-on-the-market class actions—that is, 
fraud that affects the price at which stock trades amongst investors on the secondary market.  But class 
actions challenging primary market fraud—fraud that affects the price at which the issuer itself sells 
shares—may also be attacked on circularity grounds if the issuer is owned by diversified shareholders 
and the offering is likewise marketed to diversified shareholders.  This would exclude IPOs but include 
many primary offerings by seasoned issuers. 
31  Cf. Coffee, supra note 28, at 1562 (“[E]nterprise liability in this context is a strategy akin to 
punishing the victims of burglary for their failure to take greater precautions.”). 
32  Although the out-of-pocket losses investors suffer from fraud on the market are perfectly offset 
by other investors’ gains, such fraud nevertheless imposes well-recognized societal costs: it increases the 
cost of capital for all firms and hence decreases economic efficiency.  See Amanda M. Rose, The 
Multienforcer Approach to Securities Fraud Deterrence: A Critical Analysis, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2173, 
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To be sure, the compensation and deterrence rationales for corporate 
liability in fraud-on-the-market cases still have teeth with respect to 
shareholders who are undiversified.33  But the mere presence of some 
undiversified shareholders may not be sufficient to justify the lawsuit.  This 
is because the standard deterrence and compensation benefits seem to apply 
only to undiversified shareholders.  Therefore, these social benefits of the 
litigation decrease as the degree of diversification increases.  Meanwhile, 
the social costs of litigation—lawyers’ fees, management distraction, and so 
on—do not depend on the degree of shareholder diversification.  As 
diversification increases, the benefits of the lawsuit decline, but its costs 
hold constant.  At some point the value proposition must turn negative—
that is, unless there is some other benefit of the lawsuit that applies even to 
the shareholders who over time tend to be on both sides of the “v.” 
Thus, if you accept the basic premises of the circularity critique—i.e., 
that most shareholders are diversified and that diversified shareholders do 
not suffer net out-of-pocket losses from fraud on the market—then all of 
the classic justifications for corporate liability are called into question in 
fraud-on-the-market cases.34  In Part IV we develop an alternative 
justification: that corporate liability serves a portfolio governance function 
by aligning the interests of managers with those of diversified shareholders.  
We call this the “informational theory” of corporate liability.  But before we 
explore that theory and apply it to fraud-on-the-market suits in particular, 
we consider the implications of shareholder diversification for corporate 
liability more broadly. 
 
2179–80 (2010).  It therefore ought to be deterred.  But the damages paid in fraud-on-the-market class 
actions will not cause diversified shareholders to internalize these more-amorphous societal costs either 
if the shareholders are just as likely to be members of the class receiving the damages payment as to be 
owners of the defendant corporation making the payment. 
33  Some scholars have argued that the compensation justifications for corporate liability fail even 
with respect to undiversified shareholders because those investors could diversify if they so chose.  
Diversification is a cheaper form of insurance against securities fraud than litigation.  See Merritt B. 
Fox, Why Civil Liability for Disclosure Violations When Issuers Do Not Trade?, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 297, 
309.  If investors choose not to avail themselves of diversification’s advantages, the argument is that it 
hardly seems right for the law to compensate them for their avoidable losses.  See id.  
34  Jill Fisch has argued that corporate liability is justified on behalf of informed traders, who tend to 
be undiversified by necessity and who produce a positive externality by promoting capital market 
efficiency.  “If fraud increases the cost of providing this externality, [diversified shareholders] should 
compensate traders for the resulting losses.” Jill E. Fisch, Confronting the Circularity Problem in 
Private Securities Litigation, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 333, 347–48.  We wonder whether this rationale 
remains persuasive once the possibility of a direct lawsuit against the responsible agent is recognized.  
See infra text accompanying note 55. 
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III. EXTENDING THE CRITIQUE: THE SEEMING POINTLESSNESS OF 
INTERCORPORATE LITIGATION IN A WORLD OF DIVERSIFIED 
SHAREHOLDERS 
Although there is an extensive academic literature exploring the 
implications of shareholder diversification for securities fraud litigation,35 
few scholars have considered its significance for corporate liability more 
broadly.  Yet there is nothing special about securities fraud litigation that 
should limit the arguments against corporate liability to that context.  To the 
extent that shareholders are diversified, the same concerns call into question 
the compensation and deterrence justifications for just about any lawsuit in 
which one public firm sues another, regardless of whether the cause of 
action is breach of contract, patent infringement, theft of trade secrets, or 
some other legal wrong.36 
To illustrate, imagine that Firm A and Firm B are both members of the 
S&P 500,37 and that A sues B to collect damages for an injury that B 
inflicted on A.  Imagine further that 50% of the outstanding shares of each 
company are owned by investors who also own proportionate equity stakes 
in all other S&P 500 companies.  This means that the shareholders of the 
two companies overlap by 50%.  For these overlapping shareholders the 
lawsuit between A and B serves no compensatory function, as those 
shareholders would effectively be paying damages to the same extent they 
received them.38  Nor with respect to these overlapping shareholders does 
the lawsuit serve the deterrence function traditionally attributed to corporate 
liability.  The shareholders of B who also own A have already internalized 
the costs that B imposed on A before the lawsuit was brought.  With respect 
to these shareholders, the lawsuit creates no incentive to prevent the injury 
that the shareholders did not possess already.  To be sure, the lawsuit would 
have the traditional compensation and deterrence benefits with respect to 
 
35  See, e.g., supra notes 27–29, 33–34. 
36  Robert Hansen and John Lott have observed that “[t]here are numerous economic settings where 
one firm’s actions affect other firms’ values,” including a “supplier . . . withholding shipments after 
customers have made sunk investments dependent on those shipments.”  Robert G. Hansen & John R. 
Lott, Jr., Externalities and Corporate Objectives in a World with Diversified Shareholders/Consumers, 
31 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 43, 47 (1996). 
37  The S&P 500 is an index of the 500 largest companies traded on the New York Stock Exchange 
and the NASDAQ.  Many investors own S&P 500 index funds, which give the investor equity stakes in 
all companies in the index.  The index is capitalization weighted, meaning that it allocates value across 
its 500 member companies based on the companies’ relative size as measured by their market 
capitalization.  See S&P 500, STANDARD & POOR’S, http://www.standardandpoors.com/indices/sp-
500/en/us/?indexId=spusa-500-usduf--p-us-l-- (last visited Oct. 26, 2011). 
38  We also note that the loss-spreading version of the compensation rationale for corporate liability 
seems not to apply to firm-on-firm lawsuits as a general matter.  There is no reason to think that the 
plaintiff companies will usually have fewer shareholders than the defendant companies, or will be in a 
worse position to purchase insurance.  Therefore, the loss-spreading rationale seems to be limited to 
suits in which the plaintiff is an individual or a small class rather than a public corporation. 
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the shareholders who only own shares of one of the companies.  But these 
benefits may not be sufficient to justify the lawsuit from a social 
perspective given that, as the amount of shareholder overlap increases, the 
lawsuit’s traditional social benefits decrease but its costs stay constant. 
The point at which the value proposition in firm-on-firm lawsuits turns 
negative may be reached more often than one would expect.  Hansen and 
Lott have shown that many institutional investors—who own about 50% of 
all corporate equity in the United States and over 75% of the shares of the 
largest 1000 corporations39—approach full diversification within industries, 
where firm-on-firm misconduct is most likely to occur.40  Moreover, a 
growing number of shareholders hold broad-based index funds, thereby 
approaching the ideal of the fully diversified investor.41 
Parallel logic applies if we look at the matter in terms not of 
shareholder overlap but rather of shareholder diversification across the 
economy.  Imagine a hypothetical economy with 101 firms.  Assume that 
each of the shareholders of one firm, XYZ Corp., own a proportionate equity 
stake in twenty-five randomly selected other firms in the economy.42 
 
39  Jill E. Fisch, Rethinking the Regulation of Securities Intermediaries, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1961, 
1963 (2010). 
40  See Hansen & Lott, supra note 36, at 49–50, 49 tbl.1, 51 tbl.2 (reporting evidence of substantial 
cross-ownership in the computer and automotive industries, and concluding that “[t]hese levels of cross-
ownership clearly indicate that large numbers of important shareholders would benefit from having the 
firms they own internalize externalities imposed on other firms”). 
41  See INV. CO. INST., INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK: A REVIEW OF TRENDS AND ACTIVITY IN 
THE INVESTMENT COMPANY INDUSTRY 32–33 (50th ed. 2010), available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/
2010_factbook.pdf (detailing the net inflow of capital into index funds since 1995). 
42  The assumption that the shareholders own an equal, proportionate stake of all firms in their 
portfolios is consistent with the widespread use of index funds, which typically own equal, 
capitalization-weighted proportions of the equity of each of the firms in which they invest.  The effects 
of disproportionate equity holdings across portfolio firms can be modeled as follows: 
 Let P be the cost of Firm XYZ’s investment in a precaution to avoid an accident that, if it occurs, 
will inflict costs on other firms in the economy (but not on XYZ).  Let R be the percentage by which the 
investment reduces the likelihood of the accident.  Assume that all other firms in the economy have an 
equal probability of suffering the costs of the accident.  Let T be the total costs of the accident to all 
firms if it occurs.  On these assumptions, the socially efficient result is for Firm A to invest P whenever 
P < RT. 
 Diversified share ownership complicates the analysis as follows.  Let A be the percentage of Firm 
XYZ’s equity owned by diversified shareholders.  Let B be the percentage of the equity of all other firms 
in the economy owned by these same diversified shareholders.  These shareholders would want Firm 
XYZ to invest P whenever AP < BRT.  In this inequality, the left side represents the cost of the 
investment to the diversified shareholders, and the right side represents the benefits.  The inequality can 
be rewritten (A/B)P < RT.  It follows that when A = B, the diversified shareholders will have the socially 
efficient incentive: they will want Firm XYZ to invest P when it is efficient to do so.  In that case, firm-
on-firm litigation to redress the costs of the accident will have no deterrent effect with respect to these 
diversified shareholders.  If, however, A > B, then the shareholders’ interest will be for Firm XYZ to 
underinvest in precautions because the shareholders internalize the costs of the investment more than 
they reap the benefits.  This would occur if the shareholders own a larger proportion of Firm XYZ’s 
equity than they do the equity of the other firms in their portfolios, or if their portfolios do not include 
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Imagine further that XYZ’s shareholders are deciding whether to cause XYZ 
to invest in safety measures that would reduce the chances of an industrial 
accident which, if it occurred, would injure some randomly selected group 
of the other firms in the economy.  On these assumptions, the shareholders 
of XYZ would bear 100% of the costs of the safety measures but internalize 
only 25% of the expected benefits.  It follows that, to correct the 
shareholders’ insufficient incentive to invest in precautions, we would only 
need to empower a randomly selected group of seventy-five other firms to 
sue XYZ for injury.  If instead all 100 other firms in the economy enjoyed 
the right to sue XYZ for any injuries they incurred (as would be true under 
current law), then 25% of the suits brought against XYZ would serve no 
deterrence or compensation function, as those suits would be brought to 
redress harms whose costs and benefits the shareholders of XYZ had, in 
expected value terms, already internalized.  The litigation expenses for 
those suits would be, from a social perspective, a deadweight loss.  In 
practice it would be difficult for lawmakers to determine ex ante which 
potential intercorporate suits should be allowed and which should not.  But 
it remains true that as shareholder diversification increased (meaning here 
that XYZ’s shareholders progressively added more firms to their portfolios), 
the expected social benefits of intercorporate lawsuits in this economy 
would decline, and eventually would fall below their costs.  The general 
right for firms to bring intercorporate lawsuits would then, in the absence of 
other benefits from such litigation, do more harm than good. 
We are not the first to recognize that the circularity critique of 
securities fraud class actions can be directed against intercorporate litigation 
generally.  Randall Thomas and James Cox have observed that “well 
diversified investors may own both Cisco and Northern Telecom,” and “[i]f 
there was a patent infringement judgment won by Cisco against Northern 
Telecom, this might be seen as yielding no net benefit to such a diversified 
shareholder.”43  But Thomas and Cox go on to argue that such a lawsuit 
would still be worthwhile because the circularity critique “fails to take into 
account the value society gains by enforcing its laws, including the federal 
securities laws.”44  Just what that value is, however, Thomas and Cox do not 
specify.  As explained above, intercorporate litigation fails to serve the 
traditional compensation and deterrence functions of corporate liability to 
the extent that the owners of the plaintiff and defendant overlap.  In the next 
 
all other firms in the economy.  In that case, firm-on-firm litigation to redress the harm will serve a 
(partial) deterrent effect for these diversified shareholders.  Finally, if A < B, the diversified shareholders 
will want Firm XYZ to overinvest in precautions.  This will occur if the shareholders own a smaller 
proportionate interest in Firm XYZ than they do in the other firms in their portfolios.  In that case, firm-
on-firm litigation to redress the harm will exacerbate these shareholders’ incentive to encourage XYZ to 
overinvest in precautions. 
43  See Cox & Thomas, supra note 1. 
44  Id. at 181. 
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Part we identify a new justification for intercorporate litigation that, unlike 
the traditional rationales, is valid even if we assume extensive shareholder 
diversification.  We thereby give Thomas and Cox’s essential intuition—
that firm-on-firm lawsuits must serve some purpose even for diversified 
shareholders—a more solid theoretical footing.  Whether our justification 
can also support corporate liability in fraud-on-the-market class actions is a 
separate question, to which we will return in Part V. 
IV. A NEW JUSTIFICATION FOR CORPORATE LIABILITY: THE 
INFORMATIONAL THEORY 
In this Part we seek to explain something that previous theories of 
corporate liability cannot: why shareholders would be willing to pay for 
litigation directed against themselves.  Our argument has two parts.  First, 
we assume that diversified shareholders can use financial information about 
their portfolio firms to evaluate and motivate the firms’ managers.  Second, 
we posit that litigation between portfolio firms can make firm-specific 
financial information a better indicator of managers’ contributions to total 
portfolio value.  Unlike traditional justifications for corporate liability, our 
theory takes into account that diversified shareholders already have the 
incentive, even without corporate liability, to limit intraportfolio harms.  As 
a practical matter, however, diversified shareholders lack the means to act 
on this incentive.  Our argument is that litigation between portfolio firms—
litigation in which shareholders essentially sue themselves—can provide 
those means.45 
Our claim that firm-specific financial reports permit diversified 
shareholders to evaluate and motivate managers has an analogue in the 
academic literature on corporate groups.  A corporate group is a set of legal 
entities owned by a holding company that in turn has its own (typically 
public) shareholders.  From those shareholders’ perspective, all that matters 
is the profits of the group as a whole.  Yet the holding company’s senior 
executives might treat the group’s various subsidiaries as profit centers that 
each prepare their own financial statements.46  This profit-center system 
permits the senior executives to delegate decisionmaking authority to 
midlevel managers while retaining a means for holding those managers 
accountable.  And it creates a kind of managerial tournament in which 
midlevel managers compete for pay and promotion by trying to maximize 
the profits of their respective subsidiaries. 
 
45  If the conduct giving rise to the injury also imposes costs on parties outside the portfolio, such as 
consumers or (in the case of environmental harms) property owners, diversified shareholders will not 
automatically internalize those costs.  Our theory does not undermine the traditional rationales for 
allowing third parties to recover against the employer in such situations. 
46  Richard A. Posner, The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 499, 
513 (1976). 
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For a shareholder who owns a diversified portfolio, firm-specific 
financial information can serve similar functions.  Such a shareholder will 
find it impractical to pay attention to day-to-day operations at all the firms 
he owns.  And even if he did pay attention, he rarely would own enough 
shares in any particular firm to be able to influence its affairs.  For these 
reasons, the diversified shareholder will rationally delegate almost all 
decisionmaking power to his firms’ managers.  When such delegation 
occurs, the publication of firm-specific financial data can help ensure that, 
despite the high degree of delegation, managerial interests do not deviate 
too far from those of shareholders.  For example, many public firms link the 
pay of their CEO and other top managers to the firm’s reported profits.47  
Pay can be connected to profits through a contractual formula, or it can be 
tied to the firm’s public share price, which will respond to earnings reports.  
Managers will also be motivated by the fact that poor financial results may 
induce shareholders to vote them from office or cause their firm to become 
the target of a hostile takeover. 
By motivating managers to maximize the profits of their respective 
firms, diversified shareholders hope to maximize the value of their 
portfolios as a whole.  This hope would be frustrated, however, if the 
portfolio firms could impose costs on each other with impunity.48  For 
example, Firm A might renege on a promise to deliver supplies to Firm B 
for use in B’s manufacturing process.  In that case the cost of finding 
another supplier would reduce B’s reported profits for a reason that may 
have nothing to do with the competence of B’s managers.  Because those 
managers’ pay is tied to B’s financial results, the managers will want some 
kind of adjustment, such as a compensatory payment from A to B to cover 
the costs of the missed delivery.  And shareholders who own both A and B 
may also want A to make the compensatory payment, for otherwise A’s 
reported profits would overstate, and B’s would understate, their 
management teams’ respective contributions to overall shareholder wealth.  
This is true even though the direct effect of the payment is merely to shift 
wealth from one shareholder pocket to another.  In other words, 
compensatory payments of this type would align management and 
shareholder interests by forcing managers to consider the impact of their 
actions on all firms in their shareholders’ portfolios. 
 
47  See Charles M. Yablon, Bonus Questions—Executive Compensation in the Era of Pay for 
Performance, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 271, 272 (1999) (noting the “substantial increase in the use of 
stock options, performance-based bonuses and other forms of pay for performance” since the early 
1990s). 
48  As Robert Hansen and John Lott have observed, “If shareholders own diversified portfolios, and 
if companies impose externalities on one another, shareholders do not want [share] value maximization 
to be corporate policy” but rather “want companies to maximize portfolio values.”  See Hansen & Lott, 
supra note 36, at 43. 
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The problem with such a voluntary system of compensatory payments 
is that the managers responsible for an intraportfolio harm will resist 
making the payment, as their own pay and job prospects are tied to their 
firm’s profits, which the payment would reduce.  To continue with the 
earlier hypothetical, Firm A’s managers would likely refuse Firm B’s 
demand for compensation, and if compelled to explain why might argue 
that the promise to deliver was subject to a contingency that in fact arose.  
In short, the two management teams would have an incentive to dispute 
who is at fault and for how much.  For this reason, a system of firm-to-firm 
payments to compensate for intraportfolio harms is not one that the 
managers themselves could be trusted to administer. 
Similar problems could arise in a corporate group managed under the 
profit-center system: one subsidiary could impose costs on another that 
distort each profit center’s financial data, and the conflict of interests among 
the respective management teams would make it difficult for them to agree 
on a resolution.  In that context, however, the management teams have a 
common superior: the senior executive at the holding company.  The 
executive could be called upon to resolve disputes among subsidiary 
managers, for example by setting transfer prices within the group that 
reflect the actual cost to shareholders of the resources that the various 
subsidiaries consume.  In such ways, senior executives can fine-tune the 
system to ensure that the interests of the subsidiaries’ managers do not 
deviate too far from those of the group’s ultimate shareholders. 
In the context of a diversified investment portfolio, by contrast, there 
are no such overseers.  While diversified shareholders have interests in both 
parties to an intraportfolio dispute, their rational ignorance of firm-specific 
affairs leaves them in a poor position to determine whether a compensatory 
adjustment is warranted in any particular case.  Thus, from a practical 
perspective, the managers of public firms have no common superiors, even 
if the firms themselves have common owners.  The shareholders must rely 
on someone else to sort out intraportfolio externalities and thereby protect 
the informational value of firm-specific financial information. 
An interesting question arises at this point: why is it that portfolio 
firms lack common overseers?  In other words, why do all public 
companies not merge into one sprawling corporate group whose super-
senior executive team could evaluate the performance of the constituent 
entities’ managers on behalf of public investors?  There are a variety of 
potential answers to this question, including the obvious antitrust problems 
that forming this conglomerate would entail.  But perhaps the most 
persuasive answer is that the super-senior executives, facing essentially no 
competition themselves, would be tempted to place their own interests—
including their desire to perpetuate themselves in office—ahead of the 
interests of investors.  The wave of conglomerate bust-ups in the 1980s 
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suggests that there is a point beyond which the principal–agent costs of 
bringing multiple enterprises under common control exceed the benefits.49 
In the absence, then, of economy-wide overlords, diversified 
shareholders need some other mechanism for resolving intraportfolio 
conflicts.  One possibility would be for the shareholders to allow their 
portfolio firms to bring lawsuits against the managers and employees of 
other portfolio firms responsible for intraportfolio injuries.  This would be 
the most direct way to deter undesirable behavior by corporate agents, and 
in some situations would be sufficient.  However, the drawbacks we 
mentioned earlier of direct actions against corporate agents do not go away 
merely because the two firms involved have common shareholders.  Direct 
lawsuits against employees will still be an inadequate deterrent if the 
employees are judgment proof.50  The employees also will be underdeterred 
if they systematically underestimate risk or they think their role in 
misconduct will be impossible for a plaintiff to prove.51  While diversified 
investors would want their management teams to take cost-justified steps to 
deter destructive behavior by these lawsuit-resistant employees, they cannot 
trust the managers to do so on their own initiative given that the payoff 
from investments in deterrence may not appear in the reported profits of the 
managers’ own firms. 
With corporate managers, who are likely to be wealthy, the primary 
problem with personal liability is more likely to be overdeterrence than 
underdeterrence.  Personal liability might cause managers to refrain from 
conduct that imposes costs on other portfolio firms but that nonetheless is 
cost-justified from a shareholder perspective.  An example would be a 
decision by an oil executive to build an offshore rig that, if a spill occurs, 
could damage a shrimp farm owned by another public firm.  Despite this 
risk, the oil rig might have a positive expected value to shareholders who 
own both the oil firm and the shrimp-farming firm.  Yet the executive might 
decline to build the rig if the personal liability he expects to incur from oil 
spills exceeds his share of the profits the rig would generate.  Diversified 
shareholders may not want to impose personal liability on the executive in 
this situation.  But in the absence of liability, his incentives will swing to 
the other extreme: he will be like a judgment-proof employee who is 
unimpressed by the prospect of a lawsuit against him.  He might then build 
a rig that has a negative expected value for diversified shareholders if by 
doing so he could boost his own firm’s bottom line. 
 
49  See, e.g., WILLIAM T. ALLEN, REINIER KRAAKMAN & GUHAN SUBRAMANIAN, COMMENTARIES 
AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 444 n.4 (3d ed. 2009) (discussing how the 
conglomerate mergers of the 1960s proved to be inefficient and led to the well-publicized bust-up 
takeovers of the 1980s). 
50  See supra Part I.B.1. 
51  See supra Part I.B.1. 
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These drawbacks to personal liability mean that diversified 
shareholders need some other device to prevent excessive intraportfolio 
injuries.  We propose that corporate liability can serve as this device.  
Under our informational theory, diversified shareholders effectively 
delegate to the court system the responsibility for authorizing compensatory 
payments among portfolio firms, thereby correcting the distortions in those 
firms’ financial data caused by intraportfolio injuries.  The shareholders 
themselves ultimately bear the costs of this system, as the attorneys’ fees 
and other litigation expenses incurred by both parties to an intraportfolio 
lawsuit reduce those parties’ net earnings.  Unlike the damages award, 
which is a mere shift of value from one shareholder pocket to another, these 
legal expenses deplete the total value of the shareholders’ portfolio.  Yet the 
expenses may be outweighed by the informational benefits of the lawsuit, 
which could cause financial data about each portfolio firm to better reflect 
the contribution of that firm’s managers to overall portfolio wealth.  As a 
result, managers will be more likely to make decisions that maximize 
portfolio value, including by investing in measures to prevent subordinates 
from engaging in conduct that is not cost-justified from the perspective of 
diversified shareholders. 
There are multiple mechanisms by which a lawsuit could generate 
information that influences manager behavior.  The mere filing of the suit 
may have an immediate impact on the firms’ respective stock prices if the 
lawsuit is publicized and traders take into account the suit’s expected 
impact on each firm’s bottom line.  In addition, firms may be required 
under standard accounting rules to take reserves against expected material 
litigation losses, in which case the lawsuit may have a direct effect on 
reported profits before the final judgment is entered and any damages are 
paid.  Conversely, firms could settle a matter privately if their managers 
agree on how a court would likely rule and they do not wish to reduce their 
respective profits by incurring attorney fees.  In that case, the settlement 
payment will have the effect of adjusting each firm’s reported earnings. 
Unlike traditional justifications for intercorporate liability, which grow 
weaker as the degree of shareholder diversification increases, the 
justification we develop here grows stronger.  Indeed, it is strongest if one 
assumes a market dominated by fully diversified shareholders, from whose 
perspective any litigation between publicly traded firms constitutes a 
dispute between firms the investors own.52  But what about a market in 
which shareholders are only partially diversified?  In such a market, firm-
on-firm litigation is best understood as serving a hybrid deterrence function.  
In line with traditional theory, intercorporate liability gives partially 
 
52  If most investors were fully diversified, and hence there were fewer active traders, the 
informational value of stock prices would fall.  But intraportfolio litigation would still affect firms’ 
reported profits, which could serve the informational function we describe here to the extent that profits 
were used in setting managers’ compensation. 
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diversified shareholders the right incentives to prevent their agents from 
imposing costs on firms not in their portfolio.  At the same time, in line 
with our informational theory, it provides the shareholders with the means 
for ensuring that their agents act in ways that maximize portfolio value.  
The relative importance of each function will depend on how broadly 
investors are exposed to the market as a whole (or to a particular industry, if 
firm-on-firm misconduct tends to be concentrated within industries). 
We believe that the informational theory we have outlined here has the 
potential to justify a wide range of lawsuits between firms with overlapping 
owners.  To summarize our analysis, the justification could apply to suits to 
redress two types of intraportfolio harm.  The first is harm caused by 
corporate agents who are lawsuit-resistant.  And the second is harm caused 
by agents who are not lawsuit-resistant and who were engaged in conduct 
that had the potential to increase the total value of the shareholders’ 
portfolio.  Harms of this second type would include many contract 
breaches, unintentional torts, and patent infringements (so long as the 
infringement was inadvertent).  As the oil executive example illustrated, 
these harms are the inevitable byproduct of socially productive activity.  In 
other words, the optimal amount of these harms is, from a diversified 
shareholder perspective, greater than zero.  In order not to discourage the 
activities altogether while at the same time ensuring that agents do not 
ignore the activities’ intraportfolio costs, shareholders would rationally pay 
for litigation that is ultimately directed against themselves. 
In the next Part we consider whether the type of litigation that started 
the circularity debate—securities fraud class actions against corporate 
defendants—also can be justified by the information it generates. 
V. SECURITIES FRAUD CLASS ACTIONS REVISITED 
We are now back at the point where we began this Essay: the debate 
over whether the so-called circularity critique invalidates fraud-on-the-
market lawsuits against corporate defendants.  To review the bidding, the 
debate started with commentators who noted that the diversified 
shareholders that constitute the typical class members in such actions are 
also the primary beneficiaries of securities fraud.  The lawsuits thus seem to 
serve no compensation or deterrence function; they just generate hefty fees 
for lawyers.  Rising to defend the status quo, Randall Thomas and James 
Cox argued that the circularity critique proves too much, as it could apply 
to any lawsuit between corporations owned by diversified shareholders.53  
The shareholders who own the plaintiffs and defendants in such cases 
typically overlap, and to that extent are merely suing themselves.  Yet such 
 
53  Cox & Thomas, supra note 1. 
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lawsuits are justified, Thomas and Cox argue, because they “affirm[] an 
important principle that underlies the right vindicated.”54 
As the discussion to this point makes clear, we agree with Thomas and 
Cox that the circularity critique casts a shadow on the legitimacy of any 
lawsuit between firms owned by diversified shareholders.  But we are not 
convinced by the alternative justification for such lawsuits they offer: the 
vindication of an (unspecified) principle that underlies the right to sue.  We 
think the relevant question is not whether there should be a right to sue per 
se, but rather whether that right should apply not only against the 
responsible individuals but also against their corporate employer.  On that 
question, Thomas and Cox’s argument provides no guidance. 
In this Essay we have made our own attempt to identify a benefit of 
corporate liability that applies even with respect to overlapping 
shareholders.  As we explained in Part IV, our informational theory 
explains why shareholders would be willing to pay for a wide variety of 
lawsuits that ultimately are directed at themselves.  In particular, the theory 
can justify intraportfolio suits seeking redress for harms caused by agents 
who are either (1) lawsuit-resistant or (2) lawsuit-responsive and engaged in 
activities that from a diversified shareholder’s perspective could be 
overdeterred.  Many lawsuits based on traditional common law causes of 
action—including breach of contract, strict liability, and simple 
negligence—often fall into these categories.  In this way, the informational 
theory puts a stop to the circularity bulldozer before it clears away the entire 
field of firm-on-firm lawsuits. 
The question we now reach is whether our informational theory also 
can reanimate the securities fraud lawsuits that started the circularity debate 
in the first place.  We think the answer is likely to be no, for two reasons.  
First, we think that personal liability is an effective deterrent for most types 
of securities fraud.  If the law is effective at disciplining agents directly, 
there is no need for the indirect means we describe here, whereby corporate 
liability disciplines agents through its impact on stock prices and reported 
financial results.  Second, even if this were untrue—meaning that personal 
liability were not an effective deterrent—we still think that corporate 
liability in fraud-on-the-market cases would not be justified by our 
informational theory, because the marginal value of the information 
generated by such cases is likely to be low.  We discuss these reasons in 
turn. 
With respect to the effectiveness of personal liability, the first relevant 
question is whether the corporate agents who commit fraud on the market 
tend to be lawsuit-resistant.  The answer is yes if the agents lack wealth and 
thus are not deterred by the threat of a judgment for damages.  This 
description, while perhaps apt for some lower-level corporate employees, 
 
54  Id. 
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does not fit the corporate agents who stand in a position to defraud the 
market.  Most of these agents are high-ranking corporate officers and hence 
are persons of means.  They therefore should be adequately deterred by the 
threat of personal monetary sanctions.55 
To be sure, even wealthy corporate officers might be lawsuit-resistant, 
at least some of the time.  For example, Jennifer Arlen and William Carney 
have explained that officers may be underdeterred by personal liability in a 
“last period” situation, when telling the truth will cost them their job and 
most of their wealth.56  But while this possibility argues against the 
effectiveness of personal liability in last-period situations, it does not argue 
for corporate liability as an alternative.57  Corporate liability would mitigate 
the last-period problem if it encouraged boards to invest in measures to 
prevent fraud on the market by lawsuit-resistant managers.  But corporate 
liability for last-period fraud is unlikely to have this effect because the 
directors would typically stand to gain more from the fraud than they stand 
to lose via corporate liability.58  A better solution to the last-period problem 
would be to impose criminal sanctions severe enough that even officers 
who are in extremis will heed them.59 
A second theory of lawsuit-resistant corporate officers has been offered 
by Donald Langevoort.60  Under his account, cognitive distortions such as 
overoptimism and confirmation bias may lead lower-ranking employees to 
skew the information they convey to officers, and they also may cause the 
officers to publish falsely positive information notwithstanding the seeming 
irrationality of doing so.61  We note that this theory of lawsuit resistance, if 
correct, also does not support corporate liability: why should we expect 
officers and board members to react rationally to the threat of monetary 
sanctions for the corporation if we do not expect them to react rationally to 
the much more salient threat of personal liability? 
In analyzing the effectiveness of personal liability, the next question 
we must consider is whether it will cause potential defendants to overreact.  
Recall that there are situations in which personal liability for corporate 
 
55  One might ask, if this is the case, why should we worry about the assignment of corporate 
liability given the ability of firms to seek indemnity for corporate liability from responsible agents?  
Besides the additional transaction costs associated with an indemnity action, there is reason to worry that 
boards captured by managerial interests might not seek reimbursement from managers even when it is in 
the interests of shareholders. 
56  Arlen & Carney, supra note 4. 
57  Id. at 716 (concluding that “the presence of judgment proof agents does not justify enterprise 
liability for Fraud on the Market”). 
58  See id. at 715. 
59  Id. at 718. 
60  Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead 
Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101 (1997). 
61  Id. 
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agents might discourage conduct that enhances portfolio value.62  For 
example, diversified shareholders sometimes are better off when one 
portfolio firm breaches a contract with another, but the breach might not 
occur if the responsible managers were responsible for paying the resultant 
damages.  Shareholders would prefer to immunize managers from personal 
liability in such cases.  Once the managers are immunized, however, their 
incentives are “overcorrected”: they will commit even those breaches that 
reduce portfolio value so long as doing so inflates their own firm’s profits.  
In that situation, the imposition of corporate liability could help align the 
managers’ interests with those of shareholders.  
While this rationale for corporate liability may work with breach of 
contract, it does not apply well to securities fraud, for the simple reason that 
securities fraud is not the type of behavior that shareholders would want 
corporate agents to undertake in measured amounts.  To the contrary, 
securities fraud debases the very financial data that the shareholders use to 
evaluate and motivate those agents.  In other words, diversified 
shareholders would not want management to run a cost–benefit analysis 
when deciding whether to engage in securities fraud, because to the 
shareholders there is no benefit.  Securities fraud therefore is not the type of 
conduct that can be overdeterred, at least in a way that justifies corporate 
liability as an alternative to personal liability. 
An objection at this point might be that our analysis ignores the very 
real prospect of legal error—that is, the risk that securities fraud lawsuits 
might be based on stock-price drops that managers did not foresee but that a 
jury, with the benefit of hindsight, would nonetheless blame on malice.  
This too could create an overdeterrence problem, as it could discourage 
managers not only from making dishonest statements but also from making 
statements they honestly believe to be true but that they cannot support with 
exhaustive documentation.63  As a result, firms may overspend on 
accountants, and they may withhold useful information they would 
otherwise disclose.  Put another way, while securities fraud per se has no 
upside for shareholders, financial disclosures do, and a securities fraud 
enforcement regime plagued by legal error will decrease both the quantity 
and quality of published information. 
While we agree that the possibility of legal error could motivate 
diversified shareholders to shield their agents from personal liability for 
fraud on the market, it does not follow that those same shareholders would 
want to shift that liability to the corporation rather than abolish it entirely.  
 
62  See supra Part I.B.2. 
63  To be sure, the problem of legal error today is not as severe as it may have been in the past.  See 
Rose, supra note 32, at 2220 (“[C]ongressional and judicial reforms of Rule 10b-5 class actions—
including stricter pleading requirements, a statutory safe-harbor for forward-looking statements, a 
discovery stay pending decision on a motion to dismiss, and the elimination of aiding-and-abetting 
liability—now strongly discourage private plaintiffs from bringing marginal suits.”). 
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Legal error, after all, also undermines the informational value of corporate 
liability.  Thus, a better response would be to reform the enforcement 
mechanism to increase the accuracy of securities fraud litigation targeted at 
corporate officers.64 
Although we suspect that personal liability is an adequate deterrent of 
fraud on the market, our skepticism of corporate liability for such conduct 
does not rest on that perception alone.  There are also several reasons to 
believe that the informational value of corporate liability in fraud-on-the-
market lawsuits is likely to be low.  As a result, corporate liability is 
unlikely to be cost-justified in such cases even if, contrary to our arguments 
above, securities fraud cannot be adequately deterred through personal 
liability for responsible managers. 
We have already identified one reason that fraud-on-the-market 
lawsuits against corporations might have low informational value: a high 
rate of legal error.  But there are other important reasons as well, starting 
with the method that courts use to calculate damages in such cases.  In our 
model of an intraportfolio lawsuit with high informational value, a 
necessary assumption is that the suit causes the defendant firm’s reported 
financial results to reflect the net impact of the agents’ conduct on portfolio 
value—that is, the portfolio benefits minus the portfolio costs.  But this 
description does not fit fraud-on-the-market class actions, which seek to 
punish misstatements that allegedly distorted the price of a stock trading on 
a public exchange.65  When managers make false statements that inflate 
their firm’s stock price, buyers of the stock suffer a loss but sellers receive a 
windfall.  And this upside, unlike the profits from (say) building a factory 
that also pollutes, does not automatically show up in the financial data of 
the managers’ firm.  Nor, importantly, is the corporate defendant entitled as 
a legal matter to claim credit for these “positive externalities” in the 
calculation of damages, which are set to equal buyers’ out-of-pocket losses 
without an offset for sellers’ gains.  As a result, a securities fraud suit can 
cause the defendant corporation’s financial results to understate the 
contribution of the firm’s managers to overall portfolio wealth.  The 
consequence, as with other types of legal error that produce false positives 
or excessive penalties, will be overdeterrence. 
On the other hand, this distortion in a firm’s financial data will be 
avoided if the judgment or settlement is covered by the firm’s litigation 
insurance policy.  But in that case the lawsuit may lack informational value 
altogether because the full amount of the damages—not just those in excess 
of the amount of net harm—is transferred from the books of the defendant 
to those of the insurer.  Indeed, corporate liability insurance undercuts the 
informational value of any intraportfolio lawsuit that the insurance covers.  
 
64  See generally id. (arguing that securities litigation reform should focus on improving the 
incentives of the enforcer so as to reduce the likelihood of legal error and overdeterrence). 
65  See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
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This problem would be mitigated if insurers charged higher premiums to 
firms with greater liability risk, as higher premiums would reduce those 
firms’ reported profits.  However, Tom Baker and Sean Griffith have found 
that “there is not a large marginal difference between the . . . premiums paid 
by a well-governed firm relative to a poorly-governed firm.”66  In a world of 
diversified shareholders, money spent by corporations on liability insurance 
may simply be another agency cost: a way for managers to shield their 
equity-based pay from the impact of harms they visit upon other firms in 
their shareholders’ portfolios.67 
A third reason that the information generated by corporate liability in 
fraud-on-the-market lawsuits seems to have little marginal value is that, in 
most cases, the same information has already been brought to light through 
other sources.  Our informational theory applies to agent behavior that will 
not be disciplined except through the information generated by a private 
lawsuit against the agent’s employer.  But most instances of securities fraud 
are ferreted out not by someone who will bring a private lawsuit, but rather 
by the media or another source.68  And the revelation of the fraud through 
these alternative sources creates a reputational hit that typically reduces the 
firm’s stock price by an amount several times larger than the firm’s 
expected legal penalty.69  It follows that the marginal amount of new 
information generated by a private lawsuit against the corporation is likely 
to be extremely small, especially as compared to the lawsuit’s costs.  In 
combination, these features of fraud-on-the-market lawsuits appear to make 
it highly unlikely that the marginal value of the information generated by 
corporate liability—which we have defined to include both vicarious 
liability and corporate indemnification of agents—is greater than the 
considerable legal expenses and other costs that the lawsuits impose. 
CONCLUSION 
Scholars of corporate law are preoccupied (some might say they are 
obsessed) with principal–agent conflict.  How, the scholars perennially ask, 
can lawmakers stop corporate managers from putting their own interests 
ahead of the interests of shareholders?  A long list of answers has been 
 
66  Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, The Missing Monitor in Corporate Governance: The Directors’ & 
Officers’ Liability Insurer, 95 GEO. L.J. 1795, 1821 (2007). 
67  Accord id. at 1825–34 (noting the likely connection between equity-based pay and demand for 
corporate liability insurance). 
68  One study concludes that private litigation uncovered only 3% of the incidents of fraud exposed 
between 1996 and 2004 in companies with more than $750 million in assets.  See Alexander Dyck, 
Adair Morse & Luigi Zingales, Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud? 2 (Univ. Chi. Booth Sch. 
of Bus., Working Paper No. 08-22, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=891482. 
69  See Jonathan M. Karpoff, D. Scott Lee & Gerald S. Martin, The Cost to Firms of Cooking the 
Books, 43 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 581, 582 (2008) (finding that a firm’s reputation losses as 
a result of financial fraud “exceed[ed] the legal penalty by over 7.5 times, and . . . the amount by which 
firm value was artificially inflated by more than 2.5 times”). 
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proposed, including imposing liability on corporate managers for breaching 
fiduciary duties.  To our knowledge, however, no one has given the answer 
we offer here: make the corporation—and hence, within the constraints of 
limited liability, its shareholders—legally answerable for the costs its 
agents impose on other public corporations.  Until now, corporate liability 
has been seen as a device for compensating victims and, through cost 
internalization, aligning shareholder interests with those of society.  But 
both of these justifications weaken as shareholders diversify their 
investment portfolios and hence are more likely, at least in lawsuits 
between public firms, to be paying the very damages they at the same time 
are recovering.  In other words, as shareholders become more diversified, 
their incentive to limit the costs their agents impose on other public 
corporations naturally grows.  What diversified shareholders lack are cost-
effective means for reining in those agents.  They need information, boiled 
down to dollars and cents, about each management team’s contribution to 
overall portfolio value.  Corporate liability can help provide this 
information.  Hence, corporate liability is valuable to shareholders in 
situations where personal liability for managers and employees will not 
solve principal–agent conflict, either because the agents will be deterred too 
little by the threat of a direct lawsuit, or because they will be deterred too 
much. 
But what about the Goldilocks cases—the ones in which the deterrence 
supplied by personal liability is neither too strong nor too weak, but “just 
right”?  In those cases, corporate liability appears to be unnecessary.  And, 
as we argue here, there is good reason to think that securities fraud lawsuits 
are Goldilocks cases.  Personal liability for securities fraud should serve as 
an effective deterrent.  And even if this is untrue, the information generated 
by corporate liability in fraud-on-the-market lawsuits is probably of 
minimal value.  For these reasons, corporate liability for fraud on the 
market appears to be justified neither by traditional compensation and 
deterrence rationales nor by the informational rationale we advance here.  
Meanwhile, a wide variety of other potential firm-on-firm lawsuits—breach 
of contract cases, tort cases based on negligence or strict liability, and so 
on—are not cases in which personal liability for agents would generate the 
right amount of deterrence.  These are cases in which diversified 
shareholders may be perfectly willing to allow their managers to bring 
lawsuits that are, in essence, directed against the shareholders themselves.  
Liability in those suits may be circular but it is nonetheless worthwhile.  In 
this way, our informational theory provides the first justification for 
corporate liability that can distinguish between securities fraud class actions 
and other types of intraportfolio lawsuits even when, in both contexts, the 
same shareholders are standing behind the plaintiff and the defendant. 
Yet, as corporate scholars will always remind us, principal–agent 
conflict never entirely goes away; often it just changes form.  Thus, it may 
very well be true that corporate liability in intraportfolio lawsuits makes 
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managers better agents.  But we must not forget that it is the agents who 
decide whether to bring the suits.  And this decision too can be skewed by 
conflicts of interest.  For one thing, when managers decide to bring an 
intraportfolio suit, they will not consider the litigation expenses that the 
other corporation will incur even though diversified shareholders would 
want them to.  Additionally, if there is systematic bias in favor of plaintiffs 
in a particular area of law, managers will exploit it by bringing suits in that 
area in order to inflate their firms’ reported earnings, which again will be 
contrary to diversified-shareholder interests.  An unexplored area of 
principal–agent conflict—and one that our informational theory brings into 
focus—is the degree to which litigation between public firms is itself a 
source of, and not just a solution to, agency costs. 
It follows that a practical extension of our analysis would be to 
consider how diversified shareholders might want to curb the discretion of 
managers to bring suits against other public companies.  In the extreme 
case, shareholders might want to opt their firm out of a particular category 
of intercorporate lawsuit altogether, reasoning that the information 
generated by actions in that category does not justify the litigation costs.  
Or, more modestly, shareholders might want to require that certain types of 
intercorporate lawsuit be sent to arbitration rather than to court as a means 
of reducing litigation expenses and avoiding perceived biases among judges 
and juries.  And shareholders might also want to impose a “loser pays” rule 
for attorneys’ fees in order to force managers to take both parties’ litigation 
expenses into consideration. 
Although the litigation opt-out system we imagine here could be 
implemented through charter amendments, this approach may be 
impracticable since amendments require board consent.70  A better approach 
might be to have opt-outs organized and enforced through public stock 
exchanges.  The exchanges could identify those firms that are majority-
owned by diversified shareholders, and then those firms’ shareholders could 
vote on proposals to curb or modify management’s power to bring various 
types of intercorporate suits.  The proposals might be structured to be 
binding only with respect to litigation against other qualified firms on the 
exchange whose own shareholders have adopted a matching litigation 
restriction.  Management resistance to the system would then be reduced 
because no firm’s managers would be forced to disarm unilaterally. 
Although the immediate beneficiaries of such an opt-out system would 
be the diversified shareholders of the participating firms, we see a broader 
public benefit as well.  When shareholders are on both sides of a lawsuit, 
their interests are largely aligned with those of society as a whole: they 
want the litigation to proceed only if it is meritorious and can be prosecuted 
 
70  See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b) (2010) (providing that amendments to the certificate of 
incorporation must be proposed by the board of directors). 
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and adjudicated in a cost-effective manner.  Therefore, if shareholders 
decided to opt out of a particular category of lawsuit, send it to arbitration 
rather than court, or change the rules for attorneys’ fees, their choice would 
provide a powerful market signal about the efficiency of the legal regime 
that the shareholders are modifying.  In this way, an opt-out system would 
serve as a discovery mechanism, providing information that lawmakers 
could use to reform legal rules that apply to all litigants. 
Obviously such an opt-out system would raise a multitude of issues 
that we do not attempt to address here, and perhaps there are mechanisms 
other than firm-on-firm litigation that diversified shareholders could use to 
encourage managers to maximize portfolio wealth as opposed to the 
reported profits of the managers’ own firms.  What we can say with 
confidence is, as shareholder diversification continues to increase, these 
issues will be among the leading variations on the unremitting scholarly 
theme of principal–agent conflict. 
 
